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CONCEPTUALIZING PRIVATE GOVERNANCE IN A NETWORKED 
SOCIETY 
Professor Jonathan Peters, University of Kansas* 
Professor Brett Johnson, University of Missouri** 
Internet law and policy discussions worldwide are converging 
on the idea that the private sector has a shared responsibility to 
help safeguard free expression online. This article advances those 
discussions and makes a significant contribution to the related 
literature by synthesizing Internet governance concepts with those 
of content management and with normative theories regarding the 
social value of freedom of expression—all to the end of better 
understanding the implications of privately governing speech in a 
networked society. First, this article examines the emergence of the 
“networked public sphere” that has distributed the production of 
expression and renegotiated power relationships among 
individuals, state actors, and digital intermediaries. Second, to put 
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in concrete terms the idea that intermediaries are regularly 
conducting “private speech regulation,” this article outlines the 
chain of digital intermediaries that make up the Internet’s basic 
infrastructure, shedding new light on the chain by employing a 
classification system developed originally to discuss different types 
of intermediaries and how they facilitate speech. This article uses 
the same classifications to discuss how the intermediaries can 
constrain speech. It also places these discussions in the context of 
affirmative First Amendment theory, which says the highest 
purpose of freedom of expression is to maximize individual 
participation in the public discourse. Finally, this article concludes 
by commenting on the history of corporate power over the public 
discourse and by calling on intermediaries to be transparent 
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In July 2012, a man posted a short film on YouTube 
dramatizing the life of the Prophet Muhammad filled with “scenes 
based on slurs . . . repeated by Islamophobes.”1 The film, titled 
Innocence of Muslims, attracted little attention for months—until 
an Islamic television station in Egypt aired several scenes.2 What 
happened next remains a matter of national debate. On September 
11, 2012, Islamic militants attacked the American diplomatic 
compound in Benghazi, Libya, injuring ten Americans and killing 
four others, including the United States ambassador to Libya.3 
Many observers, among them the White House press secretary and 
the United States ambassador to the United Nations, initially said 
the attack was a demonstration against Innocence of Muslims.4 
It is now believed the attack was part of a larger terrorist plot 
unrelated to the film,5 but protests against the film flared in Egypt, 
                                                
 1 Robert Mackey & Liam Stack, Obscure Film Mocking Muslim Prophet 
Sparks Anti-U.S. Protests in Egypt and Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2012), 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/obscure-film-mocking-muslim-
prophet-sparks-anti-u-s-protests-in-egypt-and-libya/. 
 2 Michael Joseph Gross, The Making of Innocence of Muslims: Cast Members 
Discuss the Film That Set Fire to the Arab World, VANITY FAIR (Dec. 27, 2012), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2012/12/making-of-innocence-of-muslims. 
 3 David D. Kirkpatrick & Steven Lee Myers, Libya Attack Brings Challenges 
for U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/13/world/middleeast/us-envoy-to-libya-is-
reported-killed.html. 
 4 Gross, supra note 2. 
 5Anne Gearan, Review of Benghazi attack faults ‘grossly’ inadequate security, 
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Yemen, Iran, and elsewhere.6 As the protests continued, Google, 
the parent company of YouTube, began acting as an arbiter of free 
speech, restricting access to the video in some places while leaving 
it unrestricted in others—performing a delicate balancing act 
normally performed by courts but increasingly familiar to Internet 
companies.7 Notably, Google blocked the availability of Innocence 
of Muslims in Egypt and Libya, citing “the very difficult situation” 
in both countries. 8  The company’s general policy is to block 
content only if it violates local laws or a platform’s terms, or if the 
company receives a valid court order to block it.9 Google conceded 
that Innocence of Muslims did not violate local laws or YouTube’s 
terms, and neither Egypt nor Libya had ordered that the video be 
blocked—and yet Google blocked it.10 
In a few parts of the world, Google did block Innocence of 
Muslims where it violated local laws. Elsewhere, in the vast 
majority of sovereigns, Google did not restrict access to the video, 
even rejecting a request from the White House to reconsider its 
decision to keep the video online and accessible at all.11 When 
questioned about its decisions, Google released a statement that 
read: 
                                                
 6 Gross, supra note 2. 
 7 Somini Sengupta, On Web, a Fine Line on Free Speech Across the Globe, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/technology/on-the-web-a-fine-line-on-free-
speech-across-globe.html. 
 8 Claire Cain Miller, As Violence Spreads in Arab World, Google Blocks 
Access to Inflammatory Video, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/technology/google-blocks-inflammatory-
video-in-egypt-and-libya.html. 
 9 Id. 
 10  Susan Benesch & Rebecca MacKinnon, The Innocence of YouTube, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 5, 2012), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/05/the-
innocence-of-youtube/. 
 11 Declan McCullagh, White House Pressures Google Over Anti-Islam Video, 
CNET (Sept. 14, 2012), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57513264-
38/white-house-pressures-google-over-anti-islam-video/; Gerry Shih, Google 
Rejects White House Request to Pull Mohammad Film Clip, REUTERS (Sept. 14, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/14/us-protests-google-
idUSBRE88D1MD20120914. 
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We work hard to create a community everyone can 
enjoy and which also enables people to express 
different opinions. This can be a challenge because 
what’s OK in one country can be offensive 
elsewhere. This video—which is widely available 
on the Web—is clearly within our guidelines and so 
will stay on YouTube.12 
To this day, Google has not offered a more detailed 
explanation of its decisions.13 
Although the Innocence of Muslims controversy might seem 
exceptional because of the worldwide drama surrounding it, it 
actually typifies the types of challenges that Internet companies are 
confronting as they police content on their platforms.14 Google, 
Facebook, Twitter, and others, are regularly conducting “private . . . 
speech regulation”15 as they “decide what types of content may be 
posted, whether to remove certain content in response to user 
requests, whether to remove content that allegedly violates the law, 
and how to display and prioritize various content types using 
algorithms.”16 Such actions—the content decisions that Internet 
companies make—deserve more scholarly attention. Right now, 
policy discussions worldwide, from the United States to the 
European Union, from South America to the United Nations, are 
converging on the idea that “the private sector has a shared 
responsibility to help safeguard free expression.”17 
This article advances those discussions and makes a significant 
contribution to the related literature by synthesizing Internet 
                                                
 12 YouTube to be Blocked in Egypt over Anti-Islam Film, CNET (Feb. 9, 2013), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57568533-93/youtube-to-be-blocked-in-
egypt-over-anti-islam-film/. 
 13 See, e.g., Jonathan Peters, Considering and Constraining the Power of 
Content Hosts, in ETHICS FOR A DIGITAL AGE 105 (Bastiaan Vanacker & Don 
Heider, eds., 2015) (discussing the “Innocence of Muslims” controversy in 
depth). 
 14 Id. at 109. 
 15 Benesch and MacKinnon, supra note 10. 
 16 Peters, supra note 13, at 105. 
 17 Hillary Clinton, Remarks on Internet Freedom, The Newseum, Washington, 
D.C. (Jan. 21, 2010), 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/135519.htm. 
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governance concepts with those of content management and with 
normative theories regarding the social value and limits of freedom 
of expression—all to the end of better understanding the 
implications of privately governing speech in a networked society. 
First, this article examines the emergence of the “networked public 
sphere” 18 that has distributed the production of expression and 
renegotiated power relationships among individuals, state actors, 
and digital intermediaries. Second, to put in concrete terms the idea 
that intermediaries are regularly conducting “private speech 
regulation,” 19 and to better understand the conceptual discussion of 
content governance, this article outlines the chain of digital 
intermediaries that make up the Internet’s basic infrastructure, 
shedding new light on the chain by employing a classification 
system developed originally to discuss different types of 
intermediaries and how they facilitate speech. 20 This article uses 
the same classifications to discuss how the intermediaries can 
constrain speech. It also places these discussions in the context of 
affirmative First Amendment theory, which says the highest 
purpose of freedom of expression is to maximize individual 
participation in the public discourse. Finally, this article concludes 
by commenting on the history of corporate power over the public 
discourse, and by calling on intermediaries to be transparent 
regarding their content-governance practices. 
II. CONTENT GOVERNANCE AND THE “NETWORKED PUBLIC 
SPHERE” 
The Internet exists on an infrastructure of privately owned 
websites, servers, and routers, without which the ordinary Internet 
user would have little or no practical ability to speak or be heard 
online.21 These intermediaries transport, host, and index billions of 
                                                
 18 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 212 (Yale University Press 2006), 
http://www.benkler.org/Benkler_Wealth_Of_Networks.pdf. 
 19 Benesch & MacKinnon, supra note 10. 
 20 David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical 
Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 386 (2010). 
 21 Id. at 377. 
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pages of content, enabling them to exercise private power over all 
manner of speech.22 Correspondingly, that power has made the 
intermediaries attractive targets for regulators, litigants, and others 
who want to censor speech that they find disagreeable.23 This 
creates a threat to the global system of free expression because 
intermediaries “are capable of exercising authority over 
wrongdoers who are otherwise unreachable because [they] are not 
capable of being identified, are beyond the jurisdiction of the state, 
or are . . . not amenable to legal pressure.” 24  Because 
intermediaries generally have a fragile commitment to the speech 
they intermediate, the threat to free speech is very real: “[R]evenue 
from each marginal customer is small and the cost of a legal 
defense . . . is high, [so] it is almost always cheaper for the 
intermediary to remove speech than to expend time or resources 
contesting even meritless claims.”25 
In some respects, of course, this is not a new phenomenon. 
Private parties have always influenced speech: Neighbors passed 
information by word of mouth, courier systems distributed news 
and information written on papyrus, the optical telegraph passed 
messages across Europe, and newspaper or book editors decided 
what the public should see and hear.26 All of which means the 
phenomenon of intermediaries is not new, but the Internet’s 
extensive reliance on them, and the public’s extensive use of the 
Internet, has had the effect of significantly amplifying the 
intermediaries’ power.27 With that in mind, this section examines 
the emergence of the “networked public sphere” 28  that has 
distributed the production of expression and renegotiated power 
relationships among individuals, state actors, and digital 
intermediaries. 
                                                
 22 Benesch & MacKinnon, supra note 10. 
 23 Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet 
Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 16 
(2006). 
 24 Ardia, supra note 20, at 378–79. 
 25 Kreimer, supra note 23, at 28. 
 26 Ardia, supra note 20, at 382. 
 27 Id. at 378. 
 28 BENKLER, supra note 18, at 212. 
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This so-called “networked public sphere” has afforded 
individuals enormous potential simultaneously to create and 
consume content that is political, cultural, social, and commercial 
in nature.29 It has “produced a quantitative change in the number of 
entry points to the sphere of highly distributed expression such that 
. . . [t]he nation state has lost its complete control as the 
administrator of the freedom of expression. 30  Whereas 
constitutional and statutory law once dominated the parameters of 
what citizens could say and the public forums in which they could 
say it, digital intermediaries have created virtual public forums 
whose norms are defined by private companies and whose 
discourse has become difficult for governments to control. 
Meanwhile, the power of the intermediaries facilitating the 
networked communication environment has increased relative to 
that of individuals, as individuals have grown dependent on the 
intermediaries to exercise their creative agency.31 Thus, although 
the right of individuals to freedom of expression is still defined 
vis-à-vis state actors, the functions of freedom of expression—
distribution of content and access to information—depend on the 
digital intermediaries,32 which in turn have enabled more people to 
enjoy the functions of freedom of expression than at any time in 
history.33 As a result, the intermediaries’ capacity to control those 
                                                
 29  Axel Bruns, BLOGS, WIKIPEDIA, SECOND LIFE, AND BEYOND: FROM 
PRODUCTION TO PRODUSAGE 19 (2008). 
 30  Ejvind Hansen, Freedom of Expression in Distributed Networks, 10 
TRIPLEC 741, 743 (2012), http://www.triple-
c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/450. 
 31 See, e.g., RONALD DEIBERT & RAFAL ROHOZINSKI, ACCESS CONTROLLED: 
THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS, AND RULE IN CYBERSPACE 7 (Ronald Deibert, 
John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, & Jonathan Zittrain, eds., 2012); JACK 
GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD 70 (2006); José van Dijck, Users Like You? Theorizing 
Agency in User-generated Content, 31 MEDIA CULTURE & SOC’Y 41, 54 (2009). 
 32 See Laura DeNardis, Hidden Levels of Internet Control, 15 Info., Comm. & 
Soc’y 720 (2012); Laura DeNardis, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE 153 (2014). 
 33  See generally ELLIOT KING, FREE FOR ALL: THE INTERNET’S 
TRANSFORMATION OF JOURNALISM (2010); BENKLER, supra note 18; Bruns, 
supra note 29 (extolling the power that interactive online platforms have given 
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functions actually threatens the individuals’ capacity to realize 
them. 
This article shows that intermediary censorship comes in all 
shapes and sizes, from state actors blocking user access to search 
engines, to web-hosting services removing content in response to 
user complaints. That is notable because the concept of speech 
constraint, discussed in this section, refers to the constraining 
effects that entities have on the “relative capacity of individuals to 
be the authors of their lives,” and “whether the sources of 
constraint are private actors or public law is irrelevant.”34 Within 
this framework, individuals have pride of place, and any undue 
constraint of individual communicative agency is seen as 
undesirable. Of course, what counts as “undue” is disputed. The 
networked communication environment has made it possible for 
individuals to create harmful content (e.g., revenge pornography),35 
leading some scholars to call for action by both state actors and 
digital intermediaries to mitigate the harmful effects.36 The result is 
that individuals, digital intermediaries, and state actors are in a 
major struggle to define the norms of freedom of expression in a 
networked environment37—and the concept of content governance 
is at the heart of that struggle. 
Governing content is about controlling the technologies 
facilitating individual agency and assigning meaning to those 
technologies,38 which must be analyzed through a “techno-social 
                                                                                                         
individuals not only to access information but also contribute to the creation of 
cultural products). 
 34 BENKLER, supra note 18, at 141. 
 35 See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge 
Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014) (defining revenge porn as “the 
distribution of sexually graphic images of individuals without their consent.”). 
 36  See generally AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW 
PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI THREATEN A FREE PRESS (2015); Mary Anne Franks, 
Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 224 (2011). 
 37  Manuel Castells, Communication, Power and Counter-Power in the 
Network Society, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 238, 258 (2007). 
 38  Ganaele Langlois, Participatory Culture and the New Governance of 
Communication: The Paradox of Participatory Media, 14 TELEVISION & NEW 
MEDIA 91, 100 (2013); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 293 (2006). 
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lens,”39 one that recognizes that society and technology are co-
determining 40  and seeks to understand the human values 
programmed into technology. 41  For those reasons, this section 
critiques scholarship on individual agency and intermediary 
control in the context of networked communication, synthesizing 
those areas to understand how the concepts of control and freedom 
of expression are being defined. The scope of this analysis is broad 
and at the institutional level, examining how intermediaries and 
state actors control content and ultimately shape the norms of 
freedom of expression. Throughout this analysis, the focus is on 
user content because it implicates individual agency as well as 
social and political values, and its potentially harmful nature often 
triggers removal actions.42 
A. Agency, Dependence, and Contested Space in Networked 
Communication 
This section explores scholarship on individual agency and 
dependence in the context of networked communication. One goal 
is to capture how and why the increasingly distributed production 
of expression has renegotiated power relationships among 
individuals, state actors, and digital intermediaries. 43 This 
renegotiation is recasting the theme of content governance as one 
of interdependence among these three stakeholders, while 
acknowledging that theoretical power imbalances do exist in 
certain areas of the networked communication system. The other 
goal in this section is to highlight that such power imbalances 
reinforce the argument that the networked communication system 
is a contested space and that content governance plays a critical 
role in how state actors, digital intermediaries, and individuals 
define the norms of networked communication. 
                                                
 39 Hector Postigo, Cultural Production and the Digital Rights Movement, 15 
INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 1165, 1171 (2012). 
 40 Leah A. Lievrouw, New Media, Mediation, and Communication Study, 12 
INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 303, 310 (2009). 
 41 See, e.g., TARLETON GILLESPIE, WIRED SHUT 74 (2007). 
 42 DEIBERT & ROHOZINSKI, supra note 31, at 4. 
 43 van Dijck, supra note 31, at 46. 
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1. Conceptualizing Content Governance and Individual Agency 
The concept of content governance resides in a web of 
scholarly literatures.44 Therefore, it is useful first to situate the 
concept within the broader field of private governance of 
communication. The broader field’s literature is far from new. 
Scholars with roots in the works of philosophers Karl Marx and 
Michel Foucault, mainly from the critical-cultural vein of the field 
of mass communication, have theorized that private media 
companies make up a regime of hegemonic control over 
individuals’ capacity to participate in the public discourse.45 In 
turn, post-positivist scholars have criticized those theories for their 
lack of empirical proof.46 The goal here, then, is to synthesize 
theories from multiple fields in order to explicate the concept of 
content governance and to understand its implications. 
Content governance is nested in a relatively recent conception 
of the field of private governance of communication: Internet 
governance,47 a large field that includes data privacy, net neutrality, 
deep-packet inspection, and the policing of child-abuse images 
online.48 The object of study connecting those dots is “the design 
and administration of the technologies necessary to keep the 
Internet operational and the enactment of substantive policy around 
                                                
 44 Id. at 42. 
 45 See, e.g., DANEL C. HALLIN, Hegemony: The American News Media from 
Vietnam to El Salvador, A Study of Ideological Change and its Limits, in 
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION RESEARCH: APPROACHES, STUDIES, ASSESSMENTS 
3 (David L. Paletz ed., 1987); ROBERT MCCHESNEY, DIGITAL DISCONNECT: 
HOW CAPITALISM IS TURNING THE INTERNET AGAINST DEMOCRACY (2013). 
 46 See, e.g., Melvin L. DeFleur, Where Have All the Milestones Gone? The 
Decline of Significant Research on the Process and Effects of Mass 
Communication, 1 MASS COMM. & SOC’Y 85 (1998); Annie Lang, Discipline in 
Crisis? The Shifting Paradigm of Mass Communication Research, 23 COMM. 
THEORY 10 (2013). 
 47 See, e.g., DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE, 
supra note 32. 
 48 Id. at 11; see also Michel van Eeten & Milton Mueller, Where is the 
Governance in Internet Governance?, 15:5 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 720 (2012); 
Malte Ziewitz & Christian Pentzold, In Search of Internet Governance: 
Performing Order in Digitally Networked Environments, 16:2 NEW MEDIA & 
SOC’Y 306 (2014). 
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these technologies.”49 Generally, the Internet governance field has 
identified a trend toward the “privatization of authority” in key 
features of Internet technology,50 and a current debate in the field 
involves the definition of that private authority. Scholarly attention 
has been dedicated to global institutions governing the Internet, 
such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), and the World 
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS).51 However, scholars 
have called for the concept of “Internet governance” to apply more 
broadly to include the “many real-world activities that actually 
shape and regulate the way the Internet works.”52 
That decision is important because if the field were broadened, 
it would permit scholars to study the role that digital intermediaries 
play in governing how individuals use networked communication 
to participate in the global public discourse.53 Intermediaries can be 
classified into several distinct types, depending on their function in 
networked communication.54 The digital intermediaries discussed 
in this section are “single-firm industry platforms”55 that facilitate 
networked communication activities.56 The platform metaphor is 
appropriate because the intermediaries support individual users and 
their agency,57 yet the user content published on the platforms is 
                                                
 49 DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE, supra note 
32, at 6. 
 50 See DEIBERT AND ROHOZINSKI, supra note 31, at 12; see also REBECCA 
MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR 
INTERNET FREEDOM (2012). 
 51  DeNardis, Hidden Levels of Internet Control, supra note 32; Dawn 
Nunziato, Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms, and Internet 
Governance, 52 EMORY L. J. 187 (2003). 
 52 van Eeten & Mueller, supra note 48, at 721. 
 53 See Langlois, supra note 38, at 93. 
 54 See infra section III. 
 55  KC Claffy & David Clark, Platform Models for Sustainable Internet 
Regulation, 4 J. INFO. POL’Y 463, 466 (2014). 
 56 It is worth mentioning here that within the chain of digital intermediaries 
discussed in the next section, content hosts—specifically third-party platforms—
represent the link in the chain that best connects with this article’s conceptual 
exploration of content governance and affirmative First Amendment theories. A 
third-party platform is a type of single-firm industry platform. 
 57 Langlois, supra note 38, at 94. 
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created within frameworks created by the intermediaries.58 The 
companies that own the platforms set the norms of the 
communicative activities that take place on the platforms. 
However, the companies do not create such norms in a vacuum. 
They respond to “pressures from . . . users that they choose to 
respect”59 when creating their terms of use, speech policies, and 
community standards. Thus, the process of creating speech norms 
on platforms is dialogical, though the true extent of individuals’ 
influence over the norms remains an open question. 
The concepts of agency and agency facilitation are important to 
understanding how speech norms are negotiated on platforms. 
These terms are also central to the meaning of freedom of 
expression in a networked society, so it is helpful to consider how 
the network empowers individuals in unique and meaningful 
ways.60 First, the network structure increases agency by increasing 
the size of the audience that individuals can reach. For example, 
the structure can turn individual agency into collective action, 
thereby affording enormous power to social movements.61 Second, 
platforms typically offer user-friendly design, ensuring that many 
individuals with low or moderate levels of technical literacy can 
contribute to online discourse.62  Third, the informal nature of 
content production and consumption has become normalized.63 As 
small-scale amateur cultural production is growing more visible 
                                                
 58  Joseph B. Walther & Jeong-woo Jang, Communication Processes in 
Participatory Websites, 18 J. OF COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 2, 4 (2012). 
 59 Claffy & Clark, supra note 55, at 466. 
 60 DEIBERT & ROHOZINSKI, supra note 31, at 3. 
 61 Andrew J. Flanagin, Craig Flanagin & Jon Flanagin, Technical Code and 
the Social Construction of the Internet, 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 179, 182 
(2010); Taso Lagos, Ted Coopman & Jonathan Tomhave, ‘Parallel Poleis’: 
Towards a Theoretical Framework of the Modern Public Sphere, Civic 
Engagement and the Structural Advantages of the Internet to Foster and 
Maintain Parallel Socio-Political Institutions, 16 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 398, 409 
(2014). 
 62 Ganaele Langlois, Mapping Commercial Web 2.0 Worlds: Towards a New 
Critical Ontogenesis, 14 THE FIBRECULTURE J. 1, 3 (2009); Flanagin, Flanagin & 
Flanagin, supra note 61, at 184. 
 63 Ramon Lobato, Julian Thomas & Dan Hunter, Histories of User-Generated 
Content: Between Formal and Informal Media Economies, 5 INT’L J. OF COMM. 
899, 909 (2011). 
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and institutional, individuals are asserting themselves as key 
players in the network. Fourth, networked communication fully 
harnesses the “necessarily participatory” nature of the creation of 
culture.64 That is significant because “[h]ow culture is produced is 
. . . an essential ingredient in structuring how freedom and justice 
are perceived, conceived, and pursued.” 65  Thus, freedom of 
expression, democratic participation, and the creation of culture are 
all interdependent and active concepts in a system of networked 
communication. 
However, some scholars are skeptical of how much 
communicative agency individuals really have—and the extent to 
which such agency makes a difference in public discourse.66 These 
scholars speak of psychological rather than real or empirically 
observable empowerment among individuals who engage in 
networked communication.67 These scholars argue that individuals 
have a “sense of agency” or “sense of empowerment,” rather than 
an actual ability to alter public policy through their participation in 
the public discourse.68 
For example, communication scholar Matthew Hindman has 
lamented the “popular enthusiasm” for the revolutionizing 
potential of technology, arguing that the enthusiasm “has made a 
sober appraisal of the Internet’s complicated political effects more 
difficult.”69 Hindman is essentially arguing that it is shortsighted to 
accept blindly that the Internet is a revolutionary medium that will 
automatically increase democratic engagement and improve the 
public discourse simply by increasing access to participate in that 
discourse. Other factors, such as how that access is controlled and 
how individuals fluidly define the norms of participating in that 
                                                
 64 Postigo, supra note 39, at 1166.  
 65 BENKLER, supra note 18, at 274. 
 66  See, e.g., MATTHEW HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY 
(2009); Ryan J. Thomas, In Defense of Journalistic Paternalism, 31 J. OF 
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discourse, must be understood before one can assess the true 
effects of networked communication on the public discourse. 
Similarly, in the journalism context, mass communication 
scholar Brendan Watson has found that Twitter users did not 
provide alternative perspectives to mainstream news coverage of 
the 2010 Deep Water Horizon oil spill.70 In other words, Twitter 
may not be so revolutionary a medium in journalism, at least in 
terms of its ability to further alternative perspectives to major 
events and thus expand the range of the public discourse. All told, 
these scholars believe that individual communicative agency 
should not be thought of in extremes; networked communications 
are neither revolutionary nor simply normalizing the status quo.71 
Rather, user agency is complex,72 and the only way to understand it 
is through careful, nuanced study. 
2. Dependence 
The notion of dependence is integral to understanding the 
concept of content governance. Individuals increasingly depend on 
the Web as their main source of consuming and sharing 
information, 73  and digital intermediaries increasingly play an 
indispensable role in facilitating individuals’ communicative 
agency.74 In this context, scholars have sought to understand the 
role that platforms play in “steering” or “channeling” their users’ 
agency.75 The process of channeling is at the heart of the meaning 
of agency and freedom of expression in a networked environment, 
pitting powerful media against speakers and audiences.76 How 
those concepts are defined affects the very nature of democratic 
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discourse online. Indeed, new media scholar Ganaele Langlois 
believes the agency-dependency balance could “pervert the very 
democratic ideals of free and unfettered communication on which 
the Internet is based.”77 She is referring to the vision of the Internet 
captured in 1996 by Internet philosopher John Perry Barlow, who 
argued in his manifesto “A Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace” that the Internet should be a realm free from the laws 
of the world of “flesh and steel.”78 As the Internet evolved and 
became popularized through the invention of the Web, Barlow’s 
extreme libertarian vision quickly became unrealistic.79 Yet the 
spirit of Barlow lives on among his contemporaries, who readily 
criticize the instrumental role that private companies play in 
networked communication. For example, legal scholar Jonathan 
Zittrain has argued that the private powers that have come to 
dominate the Internet have both expanded and constrained 
individuals’ online communicative agency.80 
Especially germane to this article is the vein of Internet 
governance research addressing “the evolution of the technical and 
transactional infrastructures concealed beneath content and how 
these infrastructures potentially constrain the future of individual 
civil liberties,” such as freedom of expression. 81  Internet 
governance scholar Laura DeNardis has written that freedom of 
expression depends on the Internet’s infrastructure as well as the 
“policies enacted to preserve both liberty and infrastructure 
reliability.”82 Similarly, legal scholar Jack Balkin has written that 
the practical ability to speak online depends on an infrastructure of 
                                                
 77 Langlois, supra note 38, at 95. 
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laws, technologies, and corporate practices.83 He says that as our 
“lives are increasingly dominated by information technology and 
information flows,” the First Amendment, with its narrow focus on 
government restrictions of speech, will grow “increasingly 
irrelevant to the key free speech battles of the future.”84 
In other words, going forward, democratic values will be as 
important as ever, but the critical decisions affecting the ability to 
speak freely online will not involve courts or constitutional law—
they will involve technological design, company practices, statutes 
and regulations, and user activities. 85  That means digital 
intermediaries have reached “the front lines of . . . governance 
issues in cyberspace,” 86  and studying them is essential to 
understanding their role in shaping norms of freedom of 
expression. To that end, this article critiques Professor DeNardis’s 
three categories of content governance—and it adds a fourth 
category that reflects the changing networked environment. 
i. Discretionary Governance 
Commercial intermediaries may voluntarily remove content 
from their platforms in the absence of a user complaint, a practice 
called “discretionary” governance.87 This form of governance is 
rare because intermediaries typically remove content in response to 
complaints or pressure from individuals or governments. Google 
exercised discretionary governance after Innocence of Muslims 
provoked protests in the Middle East.88 Despite its rarity, this 
governance type illustrates not only an intermediary’s power to 
                                                
 83 Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. 
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restrict individuals’ speech for its own reasons but also the 
generally limited means for those users to hold an intermediary 
accountable for abuses of that power. Drawing on legal scholar 
Yochai Benkler’s broad definition of constraint, such unchecked 
intermediary speech control threatens online public discourse89 and 
therefore needs to be better understood. 
Some scholars have adopted the gatekeeping metaphor—once 
reserved for the editorial processes of journalism90—to describe the 
function of intermediaries as ultimate deciders of what information 
individuals can access and what user content reaches the public 
discourse. 91  This metaphor is helpful because gatekeeping 
exemplifies a “regime of control.”92 The challenge for journalists 
of sifting and curating information and user content supplies an 
analogy for studying the challenges faced by digital intermediaries. 
Mass media scholar Jane Singer says that online news sites 
perform a “secondary gatekeeping” function by judging the value 
of user content for redistribution. 93 The sites’ decision-making 
factors usually include the content’s appropriateness as well as 
redistribution’s potential effects on the site’s bottom line. 
Similarly, mass communication scholars Joshua Braun and 
Tarleton Gillespie have studied the gatekeeping function of online 
news sites and their moderation of user comments, which are often 
“unpolished, wide-ranging, and unpredictable.” 94  In creating 
policies for managing “what is sometimes an unruly dialogue,” the 
sites must ensure that their policies “not only be practical and 
enforceable, but also balance the economic, professional, and 
ideological aspirations of the news organization.”95 Importantly, 
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“[t]he content policies and their enforcement must toe the line 
between avoiding legal liability, keeping an eye on the economic 
bottom line, and some kind of commitment to protecting their 
users’ freedom of speech and the vibrancy of the public discourse 
they produce.”96 With so many factors to consider, it is challenging 
for the news sites to distinguish valuable and invaluable speech.97 
Those realities can be projected onto the broader issue of 
content governance. Digital intermediaries such as YouTube and 
Twitter face even more challenging decisions in governing user 
content compared to those of journalistic institutions, because the 
boundaries that the digital intermediaries police through content 
governance are broader and less defined. Digital intermediaries 
have their own message and image they want to project, but those 
messages and images compete with the millions of others that 
individuals publish daily on their platforms. These intermediaries, 
therefore, must find the proper balance between promoting the 
speech of their users and protecting their own brands by not 
allowing speech to become so unruly that it causes an exodus of 
users. 
ii. Delegated Governance 
This is the second category of content governance. Public 
officials who want to suppress speech can pressure intermediaries 
to do it for them, a practice called “delegated” governance.98 The 
ease and efficiency of using intermediaries to restrict speech offers 
governments a back door for state-sponsored censorship. Some 
scholars view this governance type as the most pernicious because 
of the state actors’ lack of transparency in utilizing it.99 In a 2012 
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collection of essays, digital technology scholars Ronald Deibert 
and Rafal Rohozinski warned that the biggest threat to free speech 
today does not come from government efforts to censor or filter 
content that its citizens or subjects create.100 Rather, the biggest 
threat comes from collaborations between governments and 
commercial platforms to manage user content (e.g., entering into 
an agreement whereby the platform identifies and removes certain 
content at the government’s behest).101 Deibert and his coauthors 
argue that hybrid private-public content governance is becoming 
the new norm for controlling the public discourse.102 They say that 
state actors “no longer fear pariah status by openly declaring their 
intent to regulate and control cyberspace,” because they couch 
their need for control in terms of protecting their citizens from 
harm.103 Meanwhile, intermediaries are likely to heed government 
pressure to ensure that they can continue to operate in those 
countries.104 All of which threatens individuals’ chances to engage 
in democratic discourse via intermediaries.105 
Figure 1 presents a model of delegated content governance in 
the system of networked communication. Individuals 
simultaneously publish and consume speech via an intermediary. 
However, when an individual publishes content a state actor deems 
objectionable, the actor notifies the intermediary by flagging the 
content.106 Intermediary employees or contractors then review the 
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content to determine whether it must be removed because, for 
example, it violates the law or disrupts the platform’s business 
interests in the state actor’s polity. If the intermediary removes the 
content, that content, represented below by the dashed lines and 
which was once visible to other individuals, will become invisible 
via the intermediary. 
Figure 1: Delegated Content Governance 
 
iii. Governance Through Legal Compliance 
This is the third category of content governance, in which legal 
violations trigger content governance. For example, in the United 
States, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) governs 
the illegal use of copyrighted material as applied to user content.107 
Under the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown regime, rights-holders 
can give an intermediary notification that their copyrighted works 
are being published through the intermediary without permission. 
The intermediary must remove the content within 10 business days 
to avoid liability for vicarious or contributory infringement.108 
                                                
 107 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
 108 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(B) (2012). The intermediary must notify the alleged 
rights-violators of the takedown (§ 512(g)(2)(C) (2012)), and these authors can 
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Outside the United States, governments can notify intermediaries 
when their hosted content violates local laws and request that the 
content be removed.109 
This governance type is similar theoretically to delegated 
governance. However, in practice, this type is distinct because (1) 
it is generally transparent, and (2) it is usually clear that the content 
at issue violates statutory law (e.g., a copyright violation through 
DMCA) or an explicit constitutional test (e.g., the obscenity 
standard outlined in Miller v. California).110 
Certainly, governance through legal compliance could be seen 
as less a matter of private governance than of following the law in 
the nations where intermediaries operate. However, understanding 
this type is important because it highlights the intermediaries’ legal 
and market incentives to remove or otherwise regulate unlawful 
content in various countries, including the United States. 
iv. Governance by Crowd 
This is the fourth category of content governance, and this 
article adds it to Professor DeNardis’s list. A crowd of individuals 
online can compel digital intermediaries to remove unpopular 
content, something that legally they could not do in a traditional 
public forum, such as a public park or town square. 111 For example, 
members of a crowd sometimes compel police officers to silence a 
speaker by threatening violence in response to the person’s speech, 
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an unlawful and unconstitutional practice known as the “heckler’s 
veto.”112 
This governance type is arguably the most important to 
understand because mainstream intermediaries, such as Facebook 
and YouTube, rely on users’ flagging of undesirable content to be 
made aware of it.113 Individuals can also pressure intermediaries by 
publicizing their grievances over undesirable content. Indeed, 
Facebook removed numerous pages with misogynistic titles (e.g., 
“Dropkicking sluts in the teeth”) after a group of activists ran a 
grassroots campaign asking companies to remove their ads from 
Facebook if the social-networking site refused to remove the 
misogynistic pages.114 
Figure 2 presents a model of governance by crowd. Flagging 
follows essentially the same process as that for state actors. The 
main difference is that flagging comes from within the community 
served by the intermediary instead of from outside the community. 
Also, rather than deciding whether the flagged content violates the 
law, intermediaries in Figure 2 must decide whether the flagged 
content violates their community’s speech standards. That means 
this governance type involves the pressuring of intermediaries to 
follow a set of community norms that may amount to a “heckler’s 
veto” over some speech.115 Reaching a normative conclusion about 
whether such pressure is desirable requires a greater understanding 
of the competing values embedded in this governance type: 
protecting extreme speech and preventing harm. 
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Figure 2: Flagging Communication 
 
B. Interdependence 
Understanding the economic pressures that intermediaries face 
is critical for conceiving a system in which individuals, 
intermediaries, and state actors are interdependent, rather than one 
in which individuals are dependent on intermediaries. In the 
networked-economy context, neither stakeholder can function well 
without the other.116 Individuals and intermediaries alike demand a 
participatory culture.117 Motivating production is an important goal 
for platforms because “giving users more power over content . . . 
add[s] business value[,]”118 and the creation of user content often 
generate[s] valuable information as a byproduct. 119  That is, 
intermediaries facilitating user content typically pedal the 
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prospects of fame, entertainment, and play, all in return for 
commoditizing users’ personal data and content.120 
Scholars have been critical of this “Faustian bargain” that 
individuals are forced to make.121 Professor Langlois says it is clear 
evidence that the power dynamics within commercial participatory 
media on the Web are “both repressive and productive.”122 She 
laments that “the ease of communication, connection and 
exploration of one’s interests can only take place through agreeing 
to terms of service and terms of use that allow for [surveillance of 
personal data] and the commercialization of user-generated content 
through advertising.”123 In this system, digital intermediaries that 
host user content likely have a propensity to view offensive content 
as risky because of its potential to alienate users and lead to lost 
subscriptions, while copyright-infringing content creates a risk of 
legal liability.124 
Figure 3 presents an interdependence model for a system of 
networked communication. The arrows represent pressure that 
each actor puts on the others. Individuals can act as checks on the 
government through their speech.125 However, individuals depend 
on digital intermediaries to realize that checking function, because 
the intermediaries, of course, facilitate the speech. At the same 
time, individuals provide intermediaries a revenue source through 
commoditization of their content, meaning that intermediaries risk 
subscription and business losses if their speech restrictions are too 
great. Governments, meanwhile, can check the individuals’ 
checking power by creating public laws to regulate speech and to 
influence intermediaries’ behavior (e.g., the DMCA).126 The United 
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States Congress also immunized intermediaries from liability for 
user content through the Communications Decency Act (CDA), a 
reflection of the intermediaries’ power over governments. They are 
economic engines, according to the CDA’s preamble, which states 
that its intent is “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive 
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”127 
Figure 3: Interdependence in Networked Communication 
 
In this interdependent system, the power of speech is only as 
strong as its counter powers allow it to be, and in the United States, 
the First Amendment moderates the government’s power to 
constrain speech. So, in a system of networked communication in 
the United States, digital intermediaries are the entities with the 
greatest capacity to constrain individuals’ speech. But, unlike 
government power over individuals, intermediary power is not 
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necessarily constant. Any number of factors may cause it to wax 
and wane, such as economic or legal developments, or changing 
social norms regarding speech.128 All of which is to say: just as 
legal scholars explore how the First Amendment limits the 
government’s power to restrict speech, mass communication 
scholars must explore how digital intermediaries can act as arbiters 
of free speech—and how extralegal factors can and do limit their 
power. 
III. THE CHAIN OF DIGITAL INTERMEDIARIES 
To put in concrete terms the proposition that intermediaries are 
regularly conducting “private . . . speech regulation,”129 and to 
better understand the previous section’s conceptual discussion of 
content governance, this section outlines the chain of digital 
intermediaries that make up the Internet’s basic infrastructure. This 
section sheds new light on the chain by employing a classification 
system developed by legal scholar David Ardia to discuss different 
types of intermediaries and how they facilitate speech.130 Here, the 
same classifications are used to discuss how the intermediaries can 
constrain speech. The classifications are: (1) communication 
conduits, which transport data across the network; (2) content 
hosts, which “store, cache, or otherwise provide access to third-
party content;” and (3) search and application providers, which 
index and filter content without necessarily hosting it.131 They are 
explained and applied in the subparts below. 
A. Communication Conduits 
These intermediaries facilitate the transport of speech, and 
typically they have limited control over—and no direct knowledge 
of—the content of the speech they transport.132 In the offline world, 
examples include telephone companies that intermediate voice 
traffic and mail carriers that intermediate print materials.133 In the 
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online world, examples include Internet service providers, 
upstream providers, and the Domain Name System, all of which 
intermediate access to content by transporting data across the 
network.134 They have become attractive targets for all kinds of 
speech constraint. 
1. Internet Service Providers 
Anyone who uses the Internet must access it through a service 
provider called an ISP. It is the user’s entry point responsible for 
making web content accessible. 135  An ISP is supported by 
backbone providers that simply transmit data and “have no direct 
relationship with the actors at either endpoint.”136 Because of the 
functions it performs, an ISP can operate as a speech constraint in 
numerous ways. First, even in nations where intermediaries are 
mostly shielded from liability for user-generated content, some 
ISPs routinely disconnect users or remove their content rather than 
expend resources to defend content that has drawn complaints.137 
Second, governments and rights-holders can pressure ISPs to cut 
off a user’s Internet access after the user has received multiple 
notifications of copyright infringement. 138  Third, authoritarian 
governments have used ISPs to restrict their citizens from 
accessing the network in their countries, typically to quell 
dissent.139 
In 2011, for example, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, in 
response to street protests, ordered the country’s six ISPs to go 
offline, knocking out Internet access for five days.140 Vodafone, 
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one of the ISPs, issued a statement saying “Egyptian authorities” 141 
had demanded that the company “turn down the network 
totally.” 142  Later, Vodafone issued a statement saying that 
authorities had used the country’s emergency laws to require the 
company to send scripted pro-government text messages to its 
customers. 143  In other words, the government shut down the 
Internet, then spread propaganda using a different technology—at 
once making it difficult for Egyptians to communicate and to 
verify the claims made in the propaganda. 
2. Upstream Providers 
A variation on the theme of targeting an ISP is targeting its 
cousin, an upstream provider. They come in two basic forms: (1) A 
large ISP that provides Internet access to a local ISP, and (2) a 
server leased by a third-party platform to host its site.144 In either 
form, the provider’s function is to transfer data from the client to 
the server, creating different chokepoint threats than those created 
by source and destination ISPs, discussed above.145 In the chain of 
intermediaries, the farther from the user a provider is located 
(upstream providers are at least one layer removed from users), the 
smaller a provider’s incentive to resist any pressure to censor a 
user’s speech.146 The reason is the cost of defending speech tends 
to be more than upstream providers charge any customer, so they 
often take the cheaper option of removing content or deactivating 
users.147 This can affect not only the targeted user but also any 
number of collateral users. 
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Imagine that a service is hosting a website whose content 
triggers a takedown request. The service relies on an upstream 
provider for access to Internet users, and it hosts many sites other 
than the one whose content triggered the request. In response, the 
upstream provider could shut down the web-hosting service’s 
entire connection, taking down the site that triggered the takedown 
and innocent bystanders, other sites hosted by the service. That 
very thing happened in 2009, when the United States Chamber of 
Commerce attempted to silence a parody site created by “The Yes 
Men,” a group that stages pranks to call attention to corporate 
misbehavior.148 
Reporters received a press release saying the Chamber would 
throw “its weight behind strong climate legislation” at a National 
Press Club event, but the Chamber was not behind the release.149 It 
was the work of “The Yes Men,” who had also created a parody 
site to publicize the fake event. The Chamber sent a takedown 
request to the parody site’s upstream provider, claiming the site 
infringed the Chamber’s intellectual property rights by “directly 
copying the images, logos, design, and layout of the Chamber’s . . . 
official website . . . .”150 The upstream provider shut down the 
entire connection to the hosting service, which supported not only 
“The Yes Men” but also 400 other sites. They were all shut down. 
3. Domain Name System 
The Domain Name System (“DNS”) converts “human-readable 
host names and domain names, such as Yahoo.com, into the 
machine-readable, numerical Internet Protocol [“IP”] addresses of 
a server . . . used to point [a computer] toward the correct 
[location] on the Internet.”151 DNS is the functional equivalent of a 
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directory, making it possible for users to access websites without 
remembering their IP addresses and server locations.152 With that in 
mind, DNS can operate as a speech chokepoint in several ways. 
First, ISPs sometimes filter content to restrict access to 
pornography or websites hosting copyrighted material. ISPs can do 
so by preventing DNS servers from resolving to the proper IP 
address a user request for a website. That means the site is still 
there, but the user cannot access it with the domain name. The 
problem here is overbreadth: It is often easier for ISPs to block 
entire domains rather than specific content. In the United Kingdom, 
for example, the nonprofit Internet Watch Foundation monitors the 
web for images of child abuse and extreme pornography.153 When 
it finds such images, the organization notifies the relevant ISP or 
domain-name registrar that a bad actor is using the domain. Then, 
the ISP or registrar is expected to block or de-register the domain 
in order to protect users from inadvertent exposure to the offending 
content. The organization claims it has flagged more than 400,000 
web pages in 16 years, resulting in the blocking or de-registering 
of 100,000 domain names.154 That approach is blunt and overbroad, 
as it suppresses a domain’s objectionable and unobjectionable 
content. 
Second, in authoritarian countries like Iran and China, officials 
use DNS to suppress speech they find disagreeable; and in 
progressive countries like Belgium and Norway, officials use DNS 
to block sites that distribute child pornography.155 In the United 
States, too, DNS has disrupted speech. WikiLeaks was inaccessible 
for a short time in 2010 after the site’s DNS provider terminated its 
agreement with WikiLeaks.156 The secret-spilling site had been 
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struggling to fend off a Distributed Denial of Service (“DDoS”) 
attack after its release of classified United States embassy cables.157 
The DNS provider cited the attack as the reason it terminated its 
WikiLeaks agreement, saying the attack threatened the services it 
provided for other users.158 Without its DNS provider, WikiLeaks 
existed in the form of partial mirror sites, restricting its ability to 
operate. Earlier, WikiLeaks had contracted with Amazon Web 
Services to enhance its “stability and protect itself from DDoS 
attacks,” but Amazon also dropped WikiLeaks because of pressure 
from the United States government.159 
Congress later considered DNS blocking to combat intellectual 
property infringement, through the Stop Online Piracy Act 
(“SOPA”) introduced in 2011.160 It would have created a procedure 
for blacklisting foreign sites that allegedly hosted rights-infringing 
content. In theory, the SOPA would have protected rights-holders 
by using DNS to block access to those sites. However, the bill had 
fatal flaws.161 It empowered the United States attorney general to 
obtain injunctions against “foreign infringing sites,” defined to 
include any domain registered outside the U.S. that “facilitates” 
copyright infringement.162 The attorney general could obtain the 
injunction without an adversarial hearing and then order ISPs to 
block a domain. The attorney general also could sue any party that 
objected, while non-objecting parties would be immunized.163 Thus, 
the scheme would have created incentives for key elements of the 
Internet’s infrastructure, including DNS, to act as chokepoints by 
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assisting the government in blocking access to certain websites.164 
The SOPA did not pass.165 
B. Content Hosts 
These intermediaries play a crucial role in the distribution of 
speech, and their defining characteristic is that they, unlike 
conduits, generally have knowledge of and control over the content 
of the speech they intermediate.166 In the offline world, examples 
include bookstores and libraries, which intermediate everything 
from books to magazines and beyond.167 In the online world, 
examples include web-hosting services and third-party platforms, 
which store, cache, or otherwise provide access to content, 
operating between primary publishers and their audiences.168 Most 
speech that occurs online “is stored on or made available from 
servers owned by private intermediaries” that decide “when, how, 
and whether to make that speech available to others.”169 Web-
hosting services allow people to host their own websites, and third-
party platforms offer a variety of services, such as social 
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networking, that enable their users to share content. These 
intermediaries can constrain speech in various ways, and they have 
become big targets for those who want to suppress speech online. 
1. Web-hosting Services 
Web-hosting services can be small like Angelfire or large like 
GoDaddy, and the scope of their services varies significantly, from 
the hosting of a single webpage with limited file space to the 
provision of large-scale database support and application-
development platforms.170 Web hosts regularly receive defamation 
and copyright claims demanding the takedown of hosted material. 
Some come from companies angry that a host “is providing access 
to allegedly copyrighted material or to a speaker’s criticism of their 
corporate practices.”171 Others come from users upset by what they 
consider defamatory or offensive content. Put differently, some 
takedown demands are filed in good faith (e.g., a photographer 
demanding that a site remove a copyrighted image used without 
authorization and not constituting fair use), while others wear the 
scarlet letter of censorship (e.g., a company demanding that a site 
remove content with the intent of chilling speech). The line 
between the two can be thin. 
In 2006, for example, an anonymous blogger called Spocko 
published audio clips from a talk-radio program on KSFO-AM in 
order to criticize what the blogger characterized as the hosts’ 
“racially insensitive and religiously intolerant rhetoric.” 172 In 
response, ABC Inc., which owns the radio station and the 
copyrights to its content, sent a letter to Spocko’s web host 
claiming that the clips violated the company’s copyrights and 
demanding that the host direct Spocko to take down the clips.173 
The web host shut down Spocko’s blog, prompting Spocko to find 
a different host. Then, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a 
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nonprofit digital-rights organization, sent a letter to ABC stating 
that Spocko’s use of the clips—for the purpose of criticizing the 
radio program—constituted fair use.174 The letter also stated that 
“ABC/KSFO’s complaints amount to nothing more than an attempt 
to silence an effective critic,” warning ABC that it could be liable 
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act for misrepresenting a 
copyright claim.175 In the end, neither side filed a lawsuit, ABC 
never responded to the EFF’s letter, and Spocko moved his blog to 
a new host that promised not to restrict his expressive activities.176 
2. Third-party Platforms 
Google, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter are examples of 
third-party platforms that offer a variety of services that enable 
their users to share content. 177  When a blogger covering 
government corruption speaks to the world, he might do so via a 
blog-hosting service like Tumblr.178 When an activist organizes a 
protest, she might do so via a social-networking site like 
Facebook.179 When a citizen journalist shares photos and videos of 
a major press conference, he might do so through hosting sites like 
Flickr or YouTube. 180  Indeed, for most people, third-party 
platforms are their principal means of online and public 
communication.181 The chokepoint here stems from the reality that 
the employees who develop and enforce the platforms’ content 
rules have greater “power over who gets heard around the globe 
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than any politician or bureaucrat.”182 The rules they develop, along 
with how they enforce those rules, provide as much a study of 
arbitrary reasoning as a study of principled reasoning. A full 
exploration of the practices of third-party platforms is beyond the 
scope of this article, but consider those of Facebook—the largest 
third-party platform in the world, in terms of monthly active 
users.183 
Many hundreds of content moderators work around the clock 
for Facebook to review user complaints about posts that contain 
nudity, hate speech, pornography, threats, violence, and other 
supposed evils—working from offices in the United States, Ireland, 
and India, among others.184The complaints are voluminous. Each 
week, Facebook receives more than two million requests to remove 
content. 185  How the company responds to those requests has 
changed over time, and Dave Willner’s career at Facebook 
provides a case study in how and why the changes took place. 
After a few years working in the help center and on content policy, 
Willner, then twenty-eight years old, became head of Facebook’s 
content policy team—just six employees at the Menlo Park 
headquarters. 186  Facebook had no content rules when Willner 
joined that team, so he attempted to write the rules himself. 
He began by using university codes as models, and then, 
frustrated by their vagueness, he sought inspiration from John 
Stuart Mill’s writings and the First Amendment.187 Willner learned 
that the latter required a presumption against prior restraints of 
speech and speech should only be “banned only when it is 
intended—and likely—to incite imminent violence or lawless 
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action.”188 However, he also learned that European free-speech 
values were more limited, forbidding, for example, speech that 
“offends the dignity of members of a protected class and lowers 
their standing in society.”189 Ultimately, Willner decided that both 
regimes were too subjective—in large part because his content 
moderators, in offices around the world, brought to their roles 
different cultural norms and experiences. They needed rules that 
focused on “concrete, easily categorized actions.”190 
To that end, Facebook hired a consulting firm to produce what 
became the “Operations Manual for Live Content Moderators,” 
intended to help the diverse street-level moderators respond to 
removal requests.191 The seventeen-page manual was leaked in 
2012 to Gawker, and it drew wide criticism for its specificity and 
dubious distinctions. 192  Divided into categories like “Sex and 
Nudity,“ “Hate Content,” and “Graphic Content,” it required 
content moderators to delete, among other things: “Sex toys or 
other objects, but only in the context of sexual activity,” “Images 
of drunk and unconscious people, or sleeping people with things 
drawn on their face,” and “Photoshopped images of people, 
whether negative, positive or neutral.”193 The manual also required 
moderators to escalate some requests to Willner’s team at 
headquarters: credible threats against people, suicidal content, 
incitements to imminent lawless action, and material related to 
“international compliance,” such as holocaust denial, which is 
unlawful in some countries.194 Willner and his team operated as a 
court of last resort. 
Applying those rules proved difficult, and the company’s 
“zealousness in scrubbing users’ content” produced a number of 
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controversies. 195 First, in February 2011, Facebook removed a 
drawing posted by the New York Academy of Art that depicted a 
topless woman.196 Outraged, the school issued a statement: “[We] 
find it difficult to allow Facebook to be the final arbiter—and 
online curator—of the artwork we share with the world.” 197 
Facebook said the removal was a mistake and apologized. Second, 
in April 2011, Facebook removed a photo of two gay men kissing, 
and the company was accused of homophobia.198 Officials said the 
removal was a mistake and apologized.199 Third, in February 2012, 
a group of women gathered at Facebook’s headquarters to protest 
the regular removal of breastfeeding photos.200 Facebook said the 
removals were a mistake and apologized, revising the company’s 
content rules to clarify that users, generally, were permitted to post 
breastfeeding photos.201 
Amid these and other controversies, Facebook ended its 
relationship with the consulting firm and abandoned the manual, 
and Willner “redoubled his efforts to minimize the opportunities 
for subjective verdicts by his first responders.”202 Eventually, those 
efforts led to the adoption of new “Community Standards” 
governing “what type of expression is acceptable, and what type of 
content may be reported to us and removed.”203 Those standards 
were tested acutely in September 2012, when Facebook refused to 
block the sharing of Innocence of Muslims. Willner concluded that 
the video complied with Facebook’s standards because it contained 
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attacks on an institution, Islam, rather than a group, Muslims.204 
That distinction was critical under the new standards, which stated: 
“[p]eople can use Facebook to challenge ideas, institutions, events, 
and practices,” but Facebook will remove speech “which includes 
content that directly attacks people based on their . . . religion.”205 
Today, Facebook is evolving yet again as a potential 
chokepoint.206 It is partnering with news organizations to enable 
them to post stories directly to Facebook—instead of providing 
access to the content through a link. 207 The partnerships may 
generate good money for cash-strapped news sites, but they give 
Facebook the power to play kingmaker, to decide “which news 
organizations [will] thrive and which will die.”208 Moreover, the 
partnerships give the social-networking site greater control, at least 
technologically, over some news content. As one commentator put 
it, “In the future, it may not be the New York Times that the White 
House pressures to stop publication of a . . . story. [Officials] may 
. . . head straight for who . . . controls whether millions will 
actually see the next explosive national security investigation: 
Facebook.” 209  That control stems from the company’s content 
moderation and its algorithms that determine what users see in 
their feeds. The resulting chokepoint risks are considerable, as the 
same commentator explains: 
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News organizations have always been at risk of 
bending to the will of their advertisers—and history 
is replete of examples of them doing just that. But 
the changing dynamics around Facebook are of a 
different order. Standard Oil or Pfizer or General 
Motors never had the power to ensure millions of 
New York Times subscribers would not get their 
paper the next day. Yet with one click, Facebook 
could pull off the modern-day equivalent.210 
Of course, Facebook is not the only third-party platform 
conducting speech regulation. Google, Twitter, and Instagram, 
among others, are doing so, too, as they develop and enforce their 
own content rules.211 Facebook is highlighted here as an exemplar, 
to demonstrate how the “sovereigns of cyberspace”212 are writing a 
major chapter in the story of free speech—how they are capable of 
operating, for any number of reasons, as chokepoints separating a 
speaker from its audience.213 
C. Search and Application Providers 
These intermediaries, by indexing or filtering content, allow 
people to locate and sort through the digital world’s voluminous 
information and to direct their attention to that which interests 
them.214 In the online world, examples include search engines and 
filtering software.215 In the offline world, close analogs are not 
apparent, but the closest would be telephone directories, stock 
prices, and bond ratings.216 In any case, search engines can be 
major chokepoints because of their importance to Internet users, 
who generally must employ one to get around the Web. Filtering 
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software, by contrast, is a chokepoint by design. The exact nature 
and extent of their capacities to suppress speech vary. Like content 
hosts, and unlike communication conduits, these providers have 
limited knowledge of—and limited control over—the content of 
the speech they intermediate, insofar as search engines and 
filtering software select search results based on computer 
algorithms and thematic preferences representing the engineers’ 
judgments about which information to present and how to do so.217 
1. Search Engines 
Efforts to manipulate search results can threaten the principle 
of search neutrality: the idea that users should get the results they 
want rather than the results an interested party wants them to see.218 
Those efforts are fueled by governmental and non-governmental 
actors. First, some authoritarian governments block entire search 
engines or force them to blacklist certain queries—all to limit 
access to content that does not support the government’s official 
version of reality. Until 2010, for example, Google agreed to 
censor its results in Mainland China.219 When the company ended 
that agreement, Google began routing its Chinese traffic through 
Hong Kong servers, beyond the reach of Beijing’s censorial 
laws.220 Mainland users could still use Google, but the connection 
broke if they searched for certain terms.221 It was no longer Google 
doing the censoring, though; it was the Chinese government and 
the so-called Great Firewall of China.222 Notably, in 2012, Google 
added a feature to its Chinese homepage that warned users when 
                                                
 217 Eugene Volokh, First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search 
Results, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 9, 2012, 2:37 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2012/05/09/first-amendment-protection-for-search-
engine-search-results/. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Ryan Singel, Google, China and Censorship: A Wired.com FAQ, WIRED 
(Apr. 2, 2010, 9:47 AM), http://www.wired.com/2010/04/google-china-and-
censorship-a-wiredcom-faq. 
 220 Bianca Bosker, Google Shuts Down China Search, Redirects Users To 
Hong Kong, HUFFINGTON POST (May 23, 2010, 9:11 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/22/google-leaves-china-
googl_n_508639.html. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
56 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 15 
they entered sensitive terms that their connection might 
break.223The feature, which Google removed one year later without 
comment, also suggested alternative terms for users to try that 
would not break the connection.224 
Second, industry groups and individuals have realized the 
potential for search engines to choke off speech. Groups that lobby 
for copyright enforcement, such as the Motion Picture Association 
of America, have taken on torrent search indices that are used to 
distribute files over the Internet at fast speeds, and individuals have 
claimed that search results that are defamatory or otherwise illegal 
must be removed.225 For individuals, especially, the chief concern 
is the Internet’s long memory and the “world of Big Data and ever 
more powerful search engines, in which it seems almost everything 
is permanently recorded and accessible to almost anyone.”226 These 
are the concerns breathing life into the “Right to be Forgotten,” 
recognized in Argentina and the European Union. 227  More 
generally, such concerns are challenging news outlets in unique 
ways, even in countries where no “Right to be Forgotten” is 
recognized. 
In the United States, for example, news organizations 
frequently receive requests to remove archived stories from people 
who wish to escape the pall cast over them by negative coverage.228 
News organizations have little interest in rewriting history, but 
some, to moderate the Internet’s long memory, have agreed in 
limited circumstances to insert a line of code into online stories to 
prevent them from being found by search engines. In other words, 
the stories “can still be found in the paper’s digital archive, just as 
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they can be found in bound volumes at the local library, but they 
do not show up on Google.”229 The implications are significant: 
without an easy way to find digital information, it might as well 
not exist. 
2. Filtering Software 
In its most basic form, filtering software protects users from 
web-borne malware or spam, and screens out unwanted content.230 
Public schools and libraries use filters to comply with laws 
requiring them to deny access to adult-oriented or sexually explicit 
material. Filters, then, are designed to be chokepoints—but their 
effects can go beyond their design. Indeed, they are susceptible to 
the problems of overblocking and underblocking. 231  An 
overblocking filter screens out wanted content, and an 
underblocking filter fails to screen out unwanted content.232  
Consider, as an example, a 2012 incident at a Missouri public 
high school. While conducting research at school, students 
discovered they could access websites for anti-gay organizations 
but not websites for pro-gay organizations.233 They also discovered 
they could access the Bowers v. Hardwick opinion, in which the 
Supreme Court upheld a statute criminalizing sodomy, but they 
could not access the Lawrence v. Texas opinion, in which the 
Supreme Court invalidated state laws criminalizing sodomy.234 The 
culprit: the school’s filtering software, which placed pro-gay 
organizations in its “sexuality” category, designed to screen out 
pornography. 235  Meanwhile, the software placed anti-gay 
organizations in the “religion” category, subject to no 
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restrictions.236 As an American Library Association official told the 
New York Times, “[F]ilters are a new version of . . . pulling books 
off the shelf. The difference is, this is much more subtle and harder 
to identify.”237 
IV. AGENCY, CONTROL, AND AFFIRMATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT 
THEORY 
The previous two sections discussed content governance 
conceptually and in concrete terms through an evaluation of the 
chain of digital intermediaries and of the proposition that they are 
regularly conducting “private . . . speech regulation.” 238  This 
section places those discussions in the context of affirmative First 
Amendment theories, which generally contend that freedom of 
expression’s highest purpose is to maximize individual 
participation in the public discourse. Content governance, as a 
subfield of Internet governance, deserves the sustained attention of 
the even wider field of mass communication law, consistent with 
comments from legal scholar Enrique Armijo that networked-
communication issues “now establish the frame within which all of 
our public policy and academic debates concerning 
communications law and policy take place.”239 Connecting content 
governance and mass communication law is difficult, though, and 
several guidelines must be established to synthesize those fields. 
Although the traditional practice of mass communication law 
research has been to draw normative conclusions about freedom-
of-expression issues based on a single theoretical framework,240 it 
is unwise to draw such conclusions about content governance until 
the concept can be evaluated from the perspective of multiple 
theories of freedom of expression. In other words, scholars must be 
cautious to avoid the pitfalls of advancing normative conclusions 
unmoored from diverse First Amendment jurisprudence. 
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To that end, the starting point is to recognize, again, that digital 
intermediaries are powerful institutions that can restrict the speech 
that individuals publish on their platforms. That recognition 
permits content governance to be assessed using affirmative 
theories of freedom of expression, such as legal scholar Alexander 
Meiklejohn’s self-governance theory,241 the “new realist” theories 
of the 1990s,242 and emerging theories stressing the maximization 
of individual participation in a networked communication 
environment.243 The common thread running through these theories 
is that they all acknowledge the control that powerful non-
governmental institutions (e.g., media corporations) can exercise 
over individuals’ participation in the public discourse. Notably, the 
theories all acknowledge the potential of state actors to increase the 
individuals’ power in relation to that of the institutions. The 
affirmative theories propose various policies that state actors can 
adopt to advance the maximization of individual participation in 
the public discourse. Proponents of negative theories of freedom of 
expression, 244  which emphasize freedom from government 
interference rather than freedom to achieve specific substantive 
outcomes, have criticized those policies. But it is possible, 
nonetheless, to accept the premise that media institutions have a 
great deal of power to control the public discourse. This premise is 
the foundation for understanding the interdependent nature of 
content governance from the perspective of legal theory. 
A. Affirmative Theory 
Affirmative theories of freedom of expression find their roots 
in Professor Meiklejohn’s self-governance theory.245 Meiklejohn 
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argued that the First Amendment’s central purpose was not found 
in “the words of the speakers, but the minds of the hearers.”246 He 
said that the government may not be able to control what people 
say, but it could guarantee “everything worth saying shall be 
said.”247 In other words, freedom of expression is valued chiefly for 
its essential contribution to deliberative democracy. Not only do 
other expressive values, such as facilitating individual autonomy,248 
take a back seat to the self-governance value, but also they can be 
threats to it. To the extent that occurs, affirmative theorists argue 
that state actors are best equipped to address the threat. Indeed, 
even economics scholar Ronald Coase, the free-market champion 
and founder of the field of law and economics, believes “the case 
for government intervention in the market for ideas is much 
stronger than it is, in general, in the market for goods.”249 Put 
differently, these theorists contend that media corporations have a 
duty to maintain a diverse and robust public discourse, and if they 
fail, government must force them to do so. Affirmative theorists, 
then, generally support state action to remedy threats to democratic 
participation from private power. 
These perspectives should inform any theorizing about the 
values of, and controls over, freedom of expression in a networked 
society. Scholars in the field of “Cyberlaw” have debated whether 
the Internet is subject to the laws of the brick-and-mortar world 
since the Internet first went public.250 The consensus today is that 
such laws can and should apply to the Internet in certain situations, 
but the larger concern is how extralegal regulatory forms affect the 
Internet.251 Legal scholar Lawrence Lessig famously argued that 
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the Internet could be both liberating and constraining—and that 
social norms, the economic marketplace, and technological design 
all had greater power to regulate Internet activities than law.252 
Focusing on such “law-like effects” 253  in the network 
“systematically treat[s] technical decision-making as a source of 
Internet policy that, in its effects if not its source, now 
interpenetrates legal policy-making to create the communicative 
and informational environment in which we live.”254 
An example is Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act, which has increased the salience of the “law-like effects” of 
intermediaries’ ability to control user content.255 The statute states 
that digital intermediaries hosting third-party content shall not be 
treated as its publisher or speaker, and the statute grants the 
intermediaries immunity from civil liability if they voluntarily 
restrict access to the content, regardless of whether it is protected 
constitutionally. 256  Section 230 was intended to foster online 
expressive activities, not stifle them by incentivizing intermediary 
control. However, having the capacity to choose whether to 
exercise control of user content without fear of liability is a 
powerful legal subsidy that digital intermediaries enjoy. Legal 
scholar Rebecca Tushnet, echoing the philosophy of Professors 
Barron 257  and Sunstein, 258  believes that Section 230 affords 
“dominant providers [both] substantial market control”259 and a 
“substantial concentration[] of power over public discourse.”260 She 
has argued that intermediaries “do not generally compete to protect 
user rights,”261 and thus limiting intermediaries’ liability for user 
                                                
 252 LESSIG, supra note 38. 
 253 Sandra Braman, The Interpretation of Technical and Legal Decision-
Making for the Internet, 13 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 309, 309 (2010). 
 254 Id. at 311. 
 255 Nunziato, supra note 51. 
 256 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
 257 Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press: A New First Amendment Right, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967). 
 258 SUNSTEIN, supra note 242. 
 259 Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the 
First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 994 (2008). 
 260 Id. at 993. 
 261 Id. at 1004. 
62 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 15 
content should require a concomitant limiting of their capacity to 
control online expressive activities.262 
Exactly how that capacity should be limited is the subject of 
great debate among Internet law scholars. One approach is to treat 
digital intermediaries as public forums.263 The theory is that the 
intermediaries perform services like those performed by public 
parks or squares, insofar as individuals use both environments to 
engage in expressive activities. The implication is that the 
intermediaries’ speech regulation would be subject to First 
Amendment analysis. However, this approach has not always 
prevailed in court. In Cyber Promotions Inc. v. America Online 
Inc.,264 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania held that AOL’s email service was not the 
“functional equivalent” of a public forum.265 In other words, AOL 
was not acting as an agent supplying a forum for communication 
that state actors would normally make available. The court also 
held that AOL, unlike cable systems, did not control the “critical 
pathway” of communication.266 Rather, AOL was one of multiple 
pathways for publishing information online. 
Some extol this ruling because, as legal scholar Eric Goldman 
put it, “[c]onverting private . . . providers into state actors could, 
paradoxically, limit speech rather than increase it.”267 Others say 
the similarity of digital intermediaries and public forums should be 
embraced in the conventional sense and that the similarity should 
guide the formation of free-speech values vis-à-vis intermediaries. 
Professor Balkin believes the intermediaries are “‘public’ in the 
sense that their value as networks arises from public participation 
that produces network effects,”268 and he has argued that “digital 
technologies change the social conditions in which people speak, 
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. . . bring[ing] to light features of freedom of speech that have 
always existed in the background but now become 
foregrounded.”269 In that respect, the technologies advance the 
central purpose of freedom of speech—which is “to promote 
democratic culture” by affording individuals “a fair opportunity to 
participate in the forms of meaning making that constitute them as 
individuals.”270 
B. Synthesis 
At their core, affirmative theories of freedom of expression 
make two arguments. First, the most important expressive value is 
mass participation by individuals in a self-governing democracy. 
Second, that value faces threats not only from state actors but also 
from powerful private actors (e.g., large media conglomerates) that 
constrain individuals’ participation in the public discourse. 
Although some affirmative theorists take the extra step of 
proposing policies whereby state actors use public law to limit the 
private actors’ power, this article does not take that step. Rather, 
this article uses affirmative theories to present a framework for 
understanding the threats that digital intermediaries pose to the 
public discourse through content governance. Connecting the 
concepts from Internet governance with Professor Lessig’s theory 
of regulation helps bring the study of content governance into the 
ambit of both legal scholarship and First Amendment theory. 
Professor Lessig has argued that speech regulations should be 
analyzed through the lens of key First Amendment values.271 He 
proposed a model with four “modalities” of regulation: law, social 
norms, the marketplace, and the design of technologies facilitating 
the activity being regulated. 272  Law regulates an activity by 
punishing it or by codifying incentives that encourage individuals 
to engage in alternative activities. Norms, often defined by a 
society’s moral values, regulate an activity by socially stigmatizing 
or encouraging it. Markets regulate an activity by making it costly 
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or by incentivizing individuals to engage in alternative activities. 
And, finally, the design (“architecture”) of a technology facilitating 
an activity regulates it by enabling it to be performed only in the 
way permitted by the technology. 273  Importantly, all of these 
modalities are interdependent.274 They interact with one another in 
the context of content governance. 
First, consider law. Section 230 275  grants commercial 
intermediaries immunity from tort liability for third-party content. 
Not only are intermediaries immune from liability for hosting the 
content on their platforms, they are also immune from liability for 
removing it—essentially, from assuming control of it. Thus, 
Section 230 encourages content governance by promising that 
intermediaries will not be punished for it. Meanwhile, case law 
indicates that commercial intermediaries have a First Amendment 
right to manage content on their platforms.276 
Second, consider norms. This modality is the most important to 
this article. Because law grants intermediaries so much discretion 
to manage user content, the intermediaries must devise and enact 
                                                
 273 Lessig gives the example of smoking to illustrate his four-part model. 
Laws can make it more difficult to smoke in public places, thereby leading 
people to consider quitting. Social stigmatization may lead people to quit, lest 
they become social pariahs. The high cost of cigarettes may make the 
opportunity cost of smoking too high for many people, leading them to quit. 
Finally, the design of a cigarette makes smoking odorous and leads to lung 
cancer. If one wants to smoke but does not want to smell or get lung cancer, one 
must choose not to smoke or to use an alternative to smoking (e.g., an e-
cigarette). Id. at 122–23. 
 274 Continuing the smoking example, the high cost of cigarettes is often the 
result of laws that set the taxes governments collect on the product. The fact that 
cigarettes have a strong smell may lead to smoking being a socially stigmatized 
activity, which may in turn lead to laws that ban the activity in public places. 
 275 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
 276 See also Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding 
that a Florida statute requiring newspapers to publish responses from individuals 
who believed they were attacked in newspapers amounted to an unconstitutional 
prior restraint); Cyber Promotions v. AOL, 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996) 
(holding that AOL’s email service did not amount to a “critical pathway” of 
communication, and thus the government could not regulate it); see generally 
Bruce W. Sanford & Jane E. Kirtley, The First Amendment Tradition and Its 
Critics, in THE PRESS 263 (Geneva Overholser & Kathleen Hall Jamieson eds., 
2005).  
OCT 2016] Conceptualizing Private Governance 65 
their own policies to do so. Content-governance norms are 
constructed through a process of negotiation. 277  Sometimes, 
employees of digital intermediaries decide which types of content 
will be subject to private governance, and other times individual 
users define what constitutes undesirable content by pressuring 
intermediaries to adopt certain community values.278 
Third, consider the market. As discussed above, the networked 
economy’s structure incentivizes intermediaries to make their 
platforms a welcome place and experience for users.279 The goal is 
to attract and retain as many users as possible. This modality, then, 
is connected to the norm modality: what sells will be what the user 
community deems desirable. So, if community norms dictate that 
certain speech does not sell (i.e., its presence deters individuals 
from using a platform), that speech is not likely to survive because 
of market pressure. 
Finally, consider design. Whatever norms commercial 
intermediaries follow to govern content, they will be baked into the 
platforms’ design (which, in this context, Lessig refers to as 
“code”). For example, platforms may give users the ability to flag 
offensive content (i.e., to notify the intermediary about the content 
and request that some action be taken).280 The act of removing 
content, or of effectively excommunicating the individual who 
created it, is a function of platform design. 
Again, the modalities are interdependent, showing, among 
other things, that technological design must be conceived as a 
product of social norms. Technology policy “is the construction 
and [the] legal authorization of sociotechnical systems designed to 
select out those activities we want to render impossible (and the 
converse, those we hope to encourage).”281 “[T]echnologies are the 
product of political choices and have political consequences that 
must be recognized and acknowledged.”282 Political choices and 
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consequences imply an inherent conflict in technological design 
and implementation. We build technologies in both the physical 
and the “rhetorical sense, drawing linguistic boundaries around 
them to indicate what is part of the [technology] and what is not, 
shaping how the relationship between elements can and will be 
characterized.”283 In short, rhetoric and technology go hand-in-hand 
because technology is, itself, an argument and an interpretation of 
how it should be used. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Recall that Professor Rosen said the task of translating 
democratic principles for our time and technologies falls not only 
to judges but also to regulators, legislators, and technologists.284 
And Professor Balkin said as our “lives are increasingly dominated 
by information technology and information flows,” the doctrinal 
First Amendment, with its focus on rights against the government, 
will grow “increasingly irrelevant” to the future’s key free speech 
battles.285 Indeed, policy discussions worldwide are converging on 
the idea that “the private sector has a shared responsibility to help 
safeguard free expression,” 286  and this article advances those 
discussions and makes a significant contribution to the related 
scholarly literature by synthesizing Internet governance concepts 
and theories with those of content management and normative 
theories regarding the social value and limits of freedom of 
expression. This article also puts in concrete terms, by evaluating 
the chain of digital intermediaries that make up the Internet’s basic 
infrastructure, the proposition that intermediaries are regularly 
conducting “private . . . speech regulation.”287 
Interestingly, new realist scholars once saw broadcast media as 
a threat to individual participation in the public discourse. 
Professor Barron argued, in fact, that U.S. broadcasters wielded 
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enormous power over the public discourse simply by exercising 
their First Amendment rights to manage their own programming.288 
He said the resulting power imbalance—between broadcasters and 
viewers—derived from the medium’s pervasiveness, the 
broadcasters’ ability to reach large national audiences, and the 
reality that the limited number of broadcasting channels was 
concentrated in the hands of a few large corporations.289 Famously, 
Barron contended that broadcasters’ power was so great that 
American courts should recognize a First Amendment right of 
access—for individuals—to the broadcasters’ otherwise closed 
channels of communication, lest the public discourse grow 
stagnant.290 
Internet communications were seen as the antidote to that 
power imbalance,291 because individuals would have greater ability 
to communicate messages that compete with those of large media 
companies. More than a decade before the Web’s invention, 
sociologist and technologist Ithiel de Sola Pool recognized the 
potential of electronic communication to be an “expander[] of 
human culture”292 that would end the monopolistic reign of large 
broadcast corporations. 293  Networked communication has not 
exactly realized that potential. The Internet, like broadcast, is a 
medium in which a few major players dominate traffic and crowd 
out alternative perspectives.294 For scholars like Pool and Barron, 
the issues presented by content governance are a step back to the 
days of corporate power over the public discourse through control 
of broadcast media. The main question that remains is how far 
backward this step is. Answering that question is a task of future 
research. 
In the meantime, we urge intermediaries to be transparent 
regarding their content-governance practices. They are already 
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transparent in some ways—many have published their content 
rules and community standards, as well as reports about their 
interactions with government entities. However, they are not 
always transparent in applying their rules and standards, leaving 
users and others to wonder—in too many cases—how or why a 
particular decision was made. Intermediaries must be as open as 
possible to maintain the robustness of the public discourse they 
facilitate. Their actions merit scrutiny. After all, the phenomenon 
of intermediaries may not be new, but the Internet’s extensive 
reliance on them, combined with the public’s extensive use of the 
Internet, has amplified significantly the influence and importance 
of digital intermediaries to the public discourse.295 They are major 
players in the evolving story of free expression. 
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